• Melton Miller posted an update 9 months, 4 weeks ago

    Has remained rather atypical (while see, e.g., Lamiell, 1981; McAdams, 1996; and see also Larson and Csikszentmihalyi, 1983; Fournier et al., 2002; Conner et al., 2009). Our model from the relational self and transference (Andersen and Chen, 2002) draws from both personal construct theory (Kelly, 1955) and Mischel’s later notion of the cognitive-affective processing technique (CAPS, Mischel and Shoda, 1995), to show that folks bearing minimal resemblance to significant other individuals implicitly activate significant-other representations and this results in various perceptual, affective, and behavioral consequences. InFrontiers in Psychology | http://www.frontiersin.orgJanuary 2016 | Volume six | ArticleAndersen et al.Contextual Variability in Personalityself experienced, as well as relevant shifts in feelings (e.g., Andersen et al., 1995, 1996; Baum and Andersen, 1999; Glassman and Andersen, 1999a; Berk and Andersen, 2000, 2008; Berenson and Andersen, 2006; Reznik and Andersen, 2007; Miranda et al., 2013; Ill turn out to be the functioning self-concept at that time.Self-RegulationIn addition to Przybylinski and Andersen, 2015). Obviously, a significantother representation is an n-of-one representation, and hence, not a character prototype per se.PSYCHOANALYTIC AND PSYCHODYNAMIC Concept OF TRANSFERENCE The PsychoanalyticHistorically, the concept of transference has been focal in psychoanalysis (Freud, 1958), and has referred towards the assumption that patients re-experience unconscious psychosexual impulses (libidinous drive) and conflicts from childhood with their analyst (Freud, 1958, 1963; see also Andersen and Glassman, 1996). Libidinous drive fuels structures of thoughts (id, ego, and superego), he proposed, and despite the fact that he did note that “imagoes” may possibly be formed of one’s parents, these have no causal part inside the theory. Indeed, within the drive-structure model (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983), the structures of thoughts along with the unconscious psychosexual drive that fuels it are universal; people today differ primarily in intensity of their libidinal drive. Transference, in his view, is hence fueled by libidinal impulses and processes. Freud acknowledged too that transference can transpire outside of your patient-therapist connection, but this was far from his emphasis (Freud, 1958; see Luborsky and Crits-Christoph, 1990). Our emphasis is on socialcognitive processes in which “transference” happens in everyday perception and interpersonal interaction, arising as an ordinary, non-defensive procedure, according to significant-other understanding stored in memory which is triggered situationally by interpersonal cues. Hence, ours is usually a distinctively non-Freudian characterization, although we retain the term along with the all round assumption that a thing about one’s past encounter emerges within the present.and also building one’s personal talents and capabilities, in every single case even though managing to remain connected (“integrated”) with significant other individuals, together fulfill the former require. Safety is compromised if a balance across these elements of satisfaction cannot be reached. As such, the content of personifications and dynamisms includes these motivations and how they have been (or had been not) met together with the important other, and these are reflected in parataxic distortion with other folks (i.e., transference) also. Sullivan’s assumptions about motivation are quite consistent with ours, despite the fact that we have proposed other human wants as well–that is, for connection, autonomy, competency and control, comprehension/meaning, and safety (Andersen et al., 1997; Andersen and Chen, 2002). Like Freud, Sulliva.